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Revisiting	“Truth	in	Securities	Revisited”:		
Abolishing	IPOs	and	Harnessing	Private	Markets	in	the	Public	Good	
	
A.C.	Pritchard*	
	
Abstract:	 This	 essay	 explores	 the	 line	 between	 private	 and	 public	 markets.		 I	
propose	a	two‐tier	market	system	to	replace	initial	public	offerings.	The	lower	tier	
would	be	a	private	market	restricted	to	accredited	investors;	the	top	tier	would	be	a	
public	 market	 with	 unlimited	 access.		 The	 transition	 between	 the	 two	 markets	
would	be	based	on	issuer	choice	and	market	capitalization,	followed	by	a	seasoning	
period	 of	 disclosure	 and	 trading	 in	 the	 public	market	 before	 the	 issuer	would	 be	
allowed	to	make	a	public	offering.	I	argue	that	such	system	would	promote	not	only	
efficient	capital	formation,	but	also	investor	protection.	
	
I. Introduction 
 
Milton	 Cohen,	 in	 his	 seminal	 article,	 Truth	 in	Securities	Revisited,1	was	 the	
first	 to	 highlight	 the	 awkwardness	 created	 by	 the	 enactment	 of	 Securities	 Act	 of	
1933,2	which	regulates	public	offerings	of	 securities,	prior	 to	 the	enactment	of	 the	
Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934,	which	governs	the	disclosure	obligations	of	public	
companies.3	Cohen	 pointed	 out	 that	 if	 the	 Securities	 Act	 had	 been	 adopted	
subsequent	to,	or	simultaneously	with,	the	Exchange	Act,	it	would	have	been	natural	
for	 public	 offering	 disclosure	 obligations	 to	 piggy‐back	 on	 the	 periodic	 disclosure	
obligations	mandated	 for	 public	 companies.4	Franklin	 Delano	 Roosevelt’s	 political	
calculation,	 however,	 ensured	 that	 the	 bills	 would	 be	 separate	 and	 that	 the	
																																																																		
*	 Frances	 and	 George	 Skestos	 Professor	 of	 Law,	 University	 of	 Michigan	 Law	 School.	 This	
article	 was	 prepared	 for	 the	 Berle	 IV	 Conference	 held	 at	 University	 College,	 London.	 Thanks	 to	
participants	at	that	conference	for	helpful	suggestions	and	criticisms,	as	well	as	.		
Special	thanks	go	to	Don	Langevoort	and	Bob	Thompson.	I	was	asked	to	comment	on	their	
article,	 “Publicness”	in	Contemporary	Securities	Regulation,	 GEO.	L.J.	 (forthcoming,	 2012),	which	was	
the	inspiration	for	this	project.	Their	article	provides	a	much	more	comprehensive	discussion	of	the	
background	 issues	raised	here;	we	disagree	on	 the	best	way	 forward,	but	 I	have	benefitted	 from	a	
number	 of	 helpful	 conversations	 with	 them	 on	 this	 topic.	 I	 am	 grateful	 to	 the	 Cook	 Fund	 of	 the	
University	of	Michigan	Law	School	for	support	for	this	project.	
1	79 HARV. L. REV 1340 (1966)	
2	Pub.	L.	No.	73‐38,	48	Stat.	74	(1933),	codified	as	amended	at	15	U.S.C.	§	77.	
3	Pub.	L.	No.	73‐404,	48	Stat.	881	(1934),	codified	as	amended	at	15	U.S.C.	§	78.	
4	Cohen,	supra	note	,	at	1341‐1342.	
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Exchange	 Act	 would	 come	 second.5	That	 accident	 of	 history	 meant	 that	 the	 two	
statutes	would	develop	separate	disclosure	obligations.	That	separate	development	
ignored	 the	economic	 reality	 that	 the	 information	 investors	would	seek	 in	valuing	
securities	would	be	 largely	 the	same,	 regardless	of	whether	 they	were	purchasing	
from	 an	 issuer	 in	 a	 primary	 transaction	 or	 another	 investor	 in	 a	 secondary	
transaction.		
Companies’	public	offering	and	secondary	market	disclosure	obligations	have	
gradually	 converged	 since	 Cohen	 wrote	 in	 the	 1960s.	 The	 rise	 of	 integrated	
disclosure	in	the	1980s6	is	generally	considered	a	way	station	along	the	path	to	full‐
blown	 company	 registration.7	Company	 registration	 would	 allow	 a	 company	 to	
register	 as	 a	 public	 company	 just	 once,	 thereafter	 offering	 and	 selling	 securities	
whenever	 it	 wanted	 without	 the	 need	 to	 register	 the	 securities	 themselves.8	
Beginning	 with	 shelf	 registration	 under	 Rule	 415,9	and	 culminating	 in	 the	 SEC’s	
2005	 offering	 reforms,	10	the	 goal	 of	 company	 registration	 and	 fully	 integrated	
disclosure	 is	 now	 almost	 complete.	 After	 the	 2005	 reforms	 streamlined	 shelf	
registration,	the	largest	public	issuers	now	operate	under	the	functional	equivalent	
of	 company	 registration.	 The	 advantages	 of	 company	 registration	 are	 available,	
																																																																		
5	See	Joel	Seligman,	THE	TRANSFORMATION	OF	WALL	STREET	51‐53	(3d	ed.,	2003).	
6	See	Adoption	of	Integrated	Disclosure	System,	Securities	Act	Rel.	No.	6383	(1982).	
7	See	Stephen	 J.	Choi,	Company	Registration:	Toward	a	Status‐Based	Antifraud	Regime,	 64	U.	
CHI.	L.	REV.	567	(1997).	
8	Company	registration	 is	 the	organizing	principle	underlying	 the	American	Law	Institute’s	
proposed	codification	of	federal	securities	law.	See	FEDERAL	SECURITIES	CODE	(1980).	In	1996,	the	SEC’s	
Advisory	Committee	on	the	Capital	Formation	and	Regulatory	Processes	issued	a	report	outlining	a	
voluntary	pilot	program	for	company	registration.	Report	of	the	Advisory	Committee	on	the	Capital	
Formation	 and	 Regulatory	 Processes	 (1996),	 available	 at	
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm.		
9	Securities	Act	Rel.	No.	33‐6499	(1983)	
10	Securities	Act	Rel.	No.	33‐8591	(2005).	
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however,	 only	 for	 a	 subset	 of	 the	 companies	 that	 have	 previously	 made	 the	
transition	from	private	to	public	company	status.	Initial	public	offerings	(IPOs),	the	
customary	 path	 for	 attaining	 public	 company	 status,	 are	 not	 included	 in	 shelf	
registration;	 they	continue	 to	be	subject	 to	 the	 traditional	 regulatory	 regime,	with	
its	“gun‐jumping”	restrictions	intended	to	quell	speculative	fervor.	
The	separate	enactment	of	the	Securities	Act	and	the	Exchange	Act	has	also	
influenced	 the	 development	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 public	 and	 private	 under	
those	 two	 statutes.	 Both	 the	 Securities	 Act	 and	 the	 Exchange	 Act	 reflect	 a	
public/private	divide,	but	they	take	very	different	approaches	to	drawing	that	line.	
The	 Securities	 Act	 draws	 the	 line	 between	 public	 and	 private	 in	 a	 manner	 that	
focuses	explicitly	on	investor	protection.	The	dividing	line	under	the	Exchange	Act,	
by	 contrast,	 is	 a	 compromise,	 reflecting	 not	 only	 investor	 protection,	 but	 also	
interests	in	capital	formation	and	practical	ease	of	application.	I	argue	here	that	the	
resulting	mismatch	 between	 the	 public/private	 dividing	 lines	 under	 the	 two	 Acts	
means	that	the	transition	from	private	to	public	will	inevitably	be	an	awkward	one,	
fraught	with	problems	 for	 issuers,	 investors,	 and	 regulators.	Can	we	 reconcile	 the	
two	 dividing	 lines	 so	 that	 companies	 can	 navigate	 this	 passage	 from	 private	 to	
public	more	smoothly?	
Congress	 has	 addressed	 this	 problem,	 in	 a	 partial	 way,	 with	 its	 recent	
adoption	 of	 the	 JOBS	 Act	 (short	 for	 Jump‐start	 Our	 Business	 Start‐ups	 Act).11	
Unhappy	 with	 the	 SEC’s	 somewhat	 tepid	 efforts	 to	 facilitate	 capital	 raising	 by	
smaller	 companies,	 Congress	 afforded	 the	 SEC	 new	 authority	 to	 exempt	 offerings	
																																																																		
11	Pub.	L.	No.,	–	Stat.	–	(2012).	
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from	the	requirements	for	registered	offerings.	Along	with	that	exemptive	authority,	
Congress	 authorized	 the	 SEC	 to	 adopt	 less	 demanding	 periodic	 disclosure	 from	
companies	who	avail	 themselves	of	 this	new	offering	exemption.	These	disclosure	
requirements	 would	 presumably	 only	 apply	 until	 a	 company	 triggered	 the	
standards	 for	 full‐fledged	public	 company	status.	Those	 standards	are	also	newly‐
raised	by	the	JOBS	Act.	These	JOBS	Act	reforms	have	the	potential	to	create	a	lower	
tier	of	public	 companies,	 thus	blurring	 the	 line	between	public	 and	private.	These	
changes	have	been	roundly	criticized	by	advocates	for	investor	protection,	however,	
as	opening	the	door	wide	for	fraud	and	manipulation.12	Those	criticisms	carry	some	
weight,	given	the	abuses	that	repeatedly	occur	in	the	penny‐stock	market.	
My	 thesis	 is	 that	 the	 transition	between	private	and	public	 company	status	
could	be	made	 less	bumpy	if	we	unified	the	public/private	dividing	 line	under	the	
Securities	Act	and	Exchange	Act.	The	insight	builds	on	Cohen’s	thought	experiment	
in	 which	 Congress	 enacted	 the	 Exchange	 Act	 first.	 My	 proposed	 private/public	
standard	would	take	the	company	registration	model	 to	 its	 logical	conclusion.	The	
customary	path	to	public	company	status	is	through	an	initial	public	offering	(IPO),	
typically	with	 simultaneous	 listing	of	 the	 shares	on	an	exchange.	There	 is	nothing	
about	 public	 offerings,	 however,	 that	makes	 them	 inherently	 antecedent	 to	 public	
company	 status.	 What	 if	 companies	 became	 public,	 with	 required	 periodic	
disclosures	 to	 a	 secondary	 market,	 before	 they	 were	 allowed	 to	 make	 public	
offerings?		
																																																																		
12	Andrew	Ackerman,	Scrap	Over	Easing	IPO	Rules,	WALL	ST.	J.	C3	(March	16,	2012)	(“Former	
Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	Chairman	Arthur	Levitt	called	it	 ‘the	most	investor‐unfriendly	
bill	that	I	have	experienced	in	the	past	two	decades.’”).	
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I	 propose	 a	 two‐tier	 market	 for	 both	 primary	 and	 secondary	 transactions	
keyed	to	investor	sophistication.	The	private	market	would	be	limited	to	accredited	
investors,	while	the	public	market	would	be	accessible	to	all.	The	transition	between	
the	two	would	be	triggered	by	an	easily‐measured	quantitative	benchmark	–	market	
capitalization	 or	 trading	 volume	 –	 which	 would	 allow	 companies	 to	 elect	 public	
status	 after	 reaching	 that	 threshold.	Once	 a	 company	opted	 for	public	 status,	 that	
newly	 public	 company	 would	 have	 a	 seasoning	 period,	 during	 which	 periodic	
disclosures	 would	 be	 required.	 Only	 after	 that	 seasoning	 period	 would	 newly‐
minted	 public	 companies	 be	 allowed	 to	 sell	 shares	 to	 the	 public	 at	 large.	 Such	 a	
regime	 would	 substantially	 enhance	 the	 information	 available	 to	 the	 primary	
market	 once	 a	 public	 offering	 was	 made.	 More	 importantly,	 it	 would	 allow	 the	
secondary	 market	 to	 process	 that	 information	 prior	 to	 any	 public	 offering.	 This	
regulatory	 framework	 would	 go	 a	 long	 way	 toward	 promoting	 efficient	 capital	
formation	 and	 eliminating	 the	waste	 currently	 associated	with	 IPOs.	 A	 happy	 by‐
product	would	be	more	vigorous	investor	protection	for	unsophisticated	investors.	
I	proceed	as	follows.	Part	II	outlines	the	public/private	dividing	lines	as	they	
now	 stand	 under	 the	 Securities	 Act	 and	 the	 Exchange	 Act.	 This	 Part	 explores	 the	
recent	transition	of	Facebook	from	private	to	public	status	under	that	framework,	as	
well	 as	Congress’s	 recent	 intervention	 in	 the	 field	with	 the	 JOBS	Act.	 Part	 III	 then	
explores	the	problems	of	making	the	transition	between	private	and	public,	focusing	
on	 IPOs	 and	 their	 role	 in	 capital	 allocation.	 Facebook’s	 IPO	 again	 provides	 an	
illustration	(and	cautionary	tale).	Part	IV	then	sketches	an	alternative	to	the	current	
5
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regulatory	 framework	 based	 on	 the	 two‐tier	market	 proposal	 summarized	 above.	
Part	V	concludes.				
	
II. Private v. Public 	
	
The	 distinction	 between	 public	 and	 private	 is	 an	 important	 triggering	
mechanism	under	both	the	Securities	Act	and	Exchange	Act.	As	noted	above,	the	two	
statutes’	 differing	 demarcations	 between	 public	 and	 private	 date	 back	 to	 their	
original	 enactment	 during	 the	 New	 Deal.	 Common	 to	 both,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	
public	 designation	 carries	 with	 it	 significant	 regulatory	 consequences.	
Consequently,	 companies	 and	 their	 lawyers	 spend	 considerable	 energy	 avoiding	
public	 status.	 This	 regulatory	 arbitrage	 has	 in	 turn	 induced	 the	 SEC	 to	 spend	 like	
effort	in	curtailing	those	attempted	evasions	of	public	status.	
	
A. The	Public	Trigger	
Under	 the	 Securities	 Act,	 public	 offerings	 are	 open	 to	 any	 and	 all	 comers.	
Accordingly,	 public	 offerings	 are	 subject	 not	 only	 to	 extensive	 disclosure	
requirements,	but	also	to	a	byzantine	array	of	“gun‐jumping”	rules	intended	to	curb	
speculative	 frenzies	 for	 newly‐issued	 securities.13	Private	 offerings	 are	 exempted	
from	 registration	 and	 the	 gun‐jumping	 rules	 by	 §	 4(2)	 of	 the	 Securities	 Act.	 The	
Supreme	 Court	 has	 interpreted	 §	 4(2)	 in	 Ralston	 Purina	 as	 permitting	 private	
offerings	only	to	investors	who	can	“fend	for	themselves,”	and	therefore	do	not	need	
																																																																		
13	Those	 rules	 are	 accompanied	 by	 an	 equally	 byzantine	 array	 of	 exemptions	 to	make	 the	
whole	 scheme	 viable,	 if	 expensive.	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 summary,	 see	 Stephen	 J.	 Choi	 &	 A.C.	
Pritchard,	SECURITIES	REGULATION:	CASES	AND	ANALYSIS	404‐451	(3rd	ed.	2011).	
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the	protections	afforded	by	registration	under	the	Securities	Act.14	Because	they	are	
limited	to	sophisticated	investors,	private	offerings	are	subject	to	considerably	less	
onerous	disclosure	requirements	than	public	offerings.	Private	offerings	are	subject,	
however,	 to	 a	 number	 of	 procedures	 designed	 to	 prevent	 end	 runs	 around	 the	
public	 offering	 process,	 i.e.,	 nominally	 private	 offerings	 that	 are	 funneled	 through	
intermediaries	to	the	public	at	large:	“distributions.”15		
The	SEC	has	provided	a	safe	harbor	for	§	4(2)	under	Rule	506	of	Regulation	
D.16	Rule	506	offerings	are	 limited	to	 investors	with	the	requisite	sophistication	to	
evaluate	 the	 investment.17	This	 requirement	 is	 diluted	 somewhat,	 however,	 by	
Regulation	 D’s	 conclusive	 presumption	 that	 accredited	 investors,	 which	 includes	
individuals	with	$200,000	in	annual	 income	or	$1	million	 in	assets,	are	deemed	to	
have	 the	 requisite	 investment	 sophistication. 18 	This	 presumption,	 although	
somewhat	 difficult	 to	 square	with	Ralston	Purina,	 encourages	many	 companies	 to	
limit	their	offerings	to	accredited	investors	exclusively.	The	regulatory	presumption	
is	 that	 the	 investors	are	capable	of	assessing	 the	merits	of	an	 investment	on	 their	
own,	 without	 the	 disclosure	 mandated	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Securities	 Act.	 Market	
demands,	however,	dictate	that	some	disclosure,	comparable	to	the	core	mandatory	
disclosure	requirements,	will	be	forthcoming.	
The	Exchange	Act	also	has	a	public‐private	dividing	line,	but	it	is	framed	very	
differently.	The	Exchange	Act	dividing	line	has	been	shaped	by	its	history.	When	the	
																																																																		
14	SEC	v.	Ralston	Purina	Co,	346	U.S.	119	(1953).	
15	See	United	States	v.	Wolfson,	405	F.2d	779	(2d	Cir.	1968).	
16	17	C.F.R.	§	506.	
17	Rule	506(b)(2)(ii).	
18	Regulation	D,	Rule	501(a)(5)	&	(6).	
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Securities	 Exchange	 Act	 was	 enacted	 in	 1934,	 there	 were	 two	 types	 of	 trading	
venues:	 stock	 exchanges,	 with	 the	 New	 York	 Stock	 Exchange	 being	 the	 most	
dominant,	 and	 the	 over‐the‐counter	 (OTC)	 market.	 At	 first,	 Congress	 chose	 to	
require	disclosure	only	from	exchange‐listed	companies.19	In	1936,	Congress	added	
companies	 making	 a	 public	 offering	 to	 the	 list	 of	 public	 companies;	 periodic	
disclosures	 would	 be	 required	 after	 the	 IPO.20	Both	 of	 these	 categories	 could	 be	
avoided;	issuers	that	did	not	list	on	an	exchange	and	did	not	make	a	public	offering	
would	 not	 be	 burdened	 by	 disclosure	 requirements,	 albeit	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 less	
liquidity	 and	 less	 access	 to	 capital.	 It	 was	 not	 until	 1964	 that	 Congress	 added	
companies	trading	in	the	OTC	market	to	the	list,	closing	a	loophole	long	disliked	by	
both	the	SEC	and	the	exchanges.21	Even	then,	not	all	OTC	companies	were	brought	
within	 the	 rubric	 of	 public	 status;	 only	 companies	 with	 500	 or	 more	 “record”	
shareholders	 that	were	 also	 above	 a	 certain	minimum	asset	 size	 (currently	 set	 at	
$10	million)	 were	 included.22	Smaller	 companies,	 for	 which	 the	 opportunities	 for	
fraud	and	manipulation	are	most	prevalent,	remained	largely	unregulated.	
Notably	 absent	 from	 these	 criteria	 for	 public	 company	 status	 under	 the	
Exchange	Act	was	any	consideration	of	the	character	of	the	investors.	Sophisticated	
institutions	and	small	retail	investors	were	treated	alike	for	purposes	of	the	tally	to	
500	that	 triggered	public	company	status.	 Issuers	could	not	avoid	public	company	
status	by	limiting	their	investor	base	to	accredited	investors.	Such	a	limitation	could	
																																																																		
19	Exchange	Act	§	12(a)	&	(b),	15	U.S.C.	§	78l(a)	&	(b).	
20		Codified	at	Exchange	Act	§	15(d),	15	U.S.C.	§	78o(d).	
21	78	Stat.	565.	(1964),	codified	at	Exchange	Act	§	12(g),	15	U.S.C.	§	78l(g).	
22	Exchange	Act	Rule	12g‐1.	
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be	achieved	through	the	 imposition	of	 transfer	restrictions,	but	 it	would	not	avoid	
public	 status.	 Once	 the	 500‐shareholder	 limit	 was	 passed	 –	 whatever	 the	
sophistication	of	 those	 investors	–	 the	company	had	no	choice	but	 to	comply	with	
the	periodic	disclosure	requirements	of	the	Exchange	Act.	
Why	 the	 numerical	 trigger?	 Joel	 Seligman	 suggests	 the	 number	 reflects	 a	
political	compromise,	with	Congress	splitting	the	difference	between	the	regulators	
and	 the	 securities	 industry.23	The	 numerical	 criterion	 has	 a	 certain	 logic.	 Investor	
protection	may	 be	more	 important	 for	 larger	 companies	 because	 they	 have	more	
investors,	 but	 capital	 formation	 for	 larger	 companies	 is	 also	 potentially	 more	
significant.	Bigger	companies,	because	of	the	wider	scope	of	their	operations,	might	
have	 greater	 influence	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 capital	 allocation	 in	 the	 overall	
economy.24	(Of	 course,	 smaller	 companies	 might	 be	 more	 significant	 to	 capital	
formation	at	the	margin	because	they	have	greater	potential	for	growth.)	Whatever	
the	motivation,	the	numerical	trigger	adopted	in	1964	extended	the	earlier	pattern	
of	forcing	disclosure	from	companies	“presumed	to	be	the	subject	of	active	investor	
interest.” 25 	Companies	 with	 fewer	 investors	 were	 excluded	 for	 reasons	 of	
“practicality,”	 despite	 the	 SEC’s	 recommendation	 of	 a	 broader	 reach	 in	 its	 Special	
Study	 of	 the	 Securities	Markets.26	Obviously,	 investor	 protection	would	have	been	
maximized	by	giving	the	SEC	the	greater	regulatory	reach	that	it	sought.	Even	while	
																																																																		
23	Seligman,	supra	note	,	at	315.	
24	See,	 e.g.,	 Gil	 Sadka,	 The	Economic	Consequences	of	Accounting	Fraud	 in	Product	Markets:	
Theory	and	a	Case	from	the	U.S.	Telecommunications	Industry	(WorldCom),	 8	 AM.	L.	&	ECON.	REV.	 439	
(2006)	(demonstrating	market	distortions	created	by	massive	fraud	at	WorldCom).	
25	Cohen,	supra	note	,	at	1341.	
26	Cohen,	supra	note	,	at	1368.	The	SEC’s	recommendation	is	found	in	Report	of	the	Special	
Study	of	Securities	Markets	of	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	H.R.	Doc.	95,	88th	Cong.,	1st	
Sess.,	pt.3,	at	62‐64	(1963).	
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greatly	expanding	the	scope	of	regulation,	however,	politicians	were	concerned	by	
the	 negative	 effects	 on	 small	 companies	 if	 they	 were	 roped	 into	 the	 burdens	 of	
public	 company	status.	 Investor	protection	would	have	 to	be	balanced	against	 the	
need	to	foster	capital	formation.	
	
B. Facebook	
The	 Exchange	 Act’s	 numerical	 trigger	 for	 public	 company	 status	 recently	
emerged	 from	 technical	 obscurity	 as	 Facebook	 inched	 its	way	 toward	becoming	 a	
public	company.	In	late	2010,	Goldman	Sachs	proposed	selling	a	significant	block	of	
Facebook	 shares.27	The	 transaction	 drew	 attention	 because	 Facebook	 at	 that	 time	
was	 a	 private	 company	 and	 was	 planning	 to	 maintain	 that	 status,	 at	 least	 in	 the	
short	 term.	Goldman	planned	 to	 preserve	 Facebook’s	 private	 status	by	 selling	 the	
company’s	shares	to	private	investors	via	a	trust	that	would	bundle	their	interests	in	
a	 single	 investment	 vehicle.28	The	 bundling	 was	 the	 unusual	 feature	 of	 the	
transaction,	designed	to	keep	the	number	of	Facebook	investors	under	the	Exchange	
Act’s	 500‐shareholder	 filing	 threshold.29	Whether	 this	 approach	 was	 a	 viable	
strategy,	however,	was	open	to	debate.	Rule	12g5‐1(a)	of	 the	Exchange	Act	allows	
shares	held	of	record	by	a	legal	entity	to	be	counted	as	one	person.	Rule	12g5‐1(b),	
however,	stipulates	that	“[i]f	the	issuer	knows	or	has	reason	to	know	that	the	form	
of	 holding	 securities	 of	 record	 is	 used	 primarily	 to	 circumvent”	 the	 filing	
																																																																		
27	Evan	 Weinberger,	 Goldman’s	 Facebook	 Stake	May	 Force	 SEC’s	 Hand¸	 Law	 360	 (Jan.	 4,	
2011).		
28	Id.	
29	Facebook’s	assets	were	already	well	in	excess	of	$10	million.	
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requirement,	 “the	 beneficial	 owners	 of	 such	 securities	 shall	 be	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	
record	owners	thereof.”	In	other	words,	subsection	(b)	suggests	that	the	SEC	would	
look	through	the	legal	entity	to	the	actual	owners,	if	the	issuer	knows	that	the	entity	
is	being	used	to	avoid	public	company	filing.		
The	proposed	transaction	attracted	considerable	media	attention,	which	led	
to	the	offering’s	eventual	demise.	The	deal	was	pulled	because	of	concerns	that	the	
media	attention	could	be	deemed	to	be	a	“general	solicitation,”	which	would	cause	
the	 deal	 to	 run	 afoul	 of	 the	 Securities	 Act	 of	 1933.30	Goldman	 instead	 placed	 the	
shares	 in	 an	 off‐shore	 transaction.31	Facebook	 has	 subsequently	 proceeded	 with	
plans	for	an	initial	public	offering,	making	it	a	public	company.	Facebook’s	transition	
to	a	public	company	is	discussed	in	greater	detail	below.	32	
Facebook’s	interaction	with	the	private/public	divide	was	also	highlighted	in	
another	story	that	surfaced	at	around	the	same	time.	Word	leaked	that	the	SEC	was	
investigating	 secondary	 trading	 markets	 for	 violations	 relating	 to	 the	 resale	 of	
securities	 issued	 by	 private	 companies.33	Facebook	 was	 among	 the	 more	 notable	
companies	 traded	 on	 one	 of	 these	 venues,	 SecondMarket.	 These	 markets	 cater	
mainly	to	employees	(both	current	and	former)	of	private	companies,	but	also	some	
early‐round	 investors.	 They	 have	 experienced	 strong	 growth	 in	 recent	 years.	
																																																																		
30	Regulation	 D,	 Rule	 502(c)	 (prohibiting	 general	 solicitations	 in	 connection	 with	 private	
placements	under	Rule	506).	
31	Liz	Rappaport,	 Aaron	 Lucchetti	&	 Geoffrey	A.	 Fowler,	Goldman	Limits	Facebook	Offering,	
WALL	ST.	 J.,	 Jan.	18,	2011	 (“Goldman	Sachs	Group	 Inc.	 slammed	 the	door	on	U.S.	 clients	hoping	 to	
invest	in	a	private	offering	of	shares	in	Facebook	Inc.,	because	it	said	the	intense	media	spotlight	left	
the	deal	in	danger	of	violating	U.S.	securities	laws”).	
32	See	text	at	infra		notes	.	
33	Peter	Lattman,	Stock	Trading	in	Private	Companies	Draws	S.E.C.	Scrutiny,	N.Y.	Times	 (Dec.	
27,	2010).	
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According	to	 the	New	York	Times,	 “In	2009,	SecondMarket	completed	$100	million	
worth	of	 transactions	 in	private	shares.	Last	year,	 its	volume	was	nearly	six	 times	
that	amount,	with	Facebook	trades	making	up	the	bulk.	Its	rival	SharesPost	logged	
$625	 million	 in	 transactions	 last	 year,	 more	 than	 double	 its	 total	 from	 2010.”34	
Despite	this	growth,	these	trading	venues	are	still	dwarfed	by	the	trading	of	public	
company	shares	on	registered	exchanges.	There	are	substantial	limits	on	the	volume	
of	 trading	 in	 these	 private	 markets	 as	 currently	 structured.	 SecondMarket	 and	
similar	 venues	 do	 not	 provide	 the	 liquidity	 afforded	 by	 an	 exchange,	 as	 they	 lack	
specialists	 and	 market	 makers.	 Instead,	 they	 provide	 the	 more	 limited	 liquidity	
service	of	matching	buyers	and	sellers	in	a	central	(virtual)	location.35	These	trading	
venues	 are	 limited	 to	 accredited	 investors,	 and	 the	 venues	 screen	 prospective	
investors	to	ensure	that	they	qualify	as	accredited.36	These	precautions	are	taken	to	
help	 ensure	 that	 the	 shares	 are	not	 being	 “distributed”	 to	 the	public,	which	 could	
render	 the	 trading	 venue	 an	 underwriter	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 Securities	 Act.37	
Notwithstanding	 these	 limitations	 under	 current	 regulation,	 the	 growth	 of	 these	
venues	 suggests	 clear	 potential	 for	 expansion,	 if	 the	 regulatory	 scheme	 would	
accommodate	 it.	 The	 SEC’s	 investigation,	 however,	 makes	 the	 future	 of	 private	
markets	uncertain.	
																																																																		
34	Evelyn	M.	Rusli	&	Peter	Lattman,	Losing	a	Goose	That	Laid	the	Golden	Egg,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Feb.	
2,	2012).	
35	Richard	 Teitelbaum,	 Facebook	 Drives	 SecondMarket	 Broking	 $1	 Billion	 Private	 Shares,	
Bloomberg	Markets	Magazine,	April	27,	2011	available	at	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐
04‐27/facebook‐drives‐second.	
36	Id.	
37	See	Gilligan,	Will	&	Co.	v.	SEC,	267	F.2d	461	(2d	Cir.	1959)	(interpreting	§	2(a)(11)	of	the	
Securities	Act,	definition	of	an	“underwriter”).	
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The	SEC	later	announced	that	it	had	reached	a	settlement	of	an	enforcement	
action	 with	 SharesPost.	 The	 agency’s	 complaint	 in	 that	 action	 alleged	 that	 the	
trading	 venue	 had	 been	 operating	 as	 an	 unlicensed	 broker‐dealer.38	At	 the	 same	
time,	 the	 SEC	 announced	 the	 filing	 of	 an	 enforcement	 action	 against	 Felix	
Investments.	The	SEC’s	complaint	alleged	 that	Felix	 took	secret	commissions	 from	
the	sellers	of	private	shares,	in	addition	to	the	fees	paid	by	purchasers.	The	agency	
also	alleged	that	Felix	had	mislead	investors	in	connection	with	the	sale	of	Facebook	
shares.	The	SharesPost	enforcement	action	is	a	mere	regulatory	violation;	the	Felix	
action,	however,	is	a	reminder	of	the	vulnerability	to	manipulation	of	thinly‐traded	
markets.39		
	
C. The	JOBS	Act	
The	 fallout	 from	 Goldman’s	 failed	 private	 offering	 of	 Facebook	 shares	
triggered	 a	 rather	 dramatic	 legislative	 response.	 Lawmakers	 in	 Congress	 seized	
upon	the	salient	occasion	to	attack	the	SEC	for	 the	obstacles	 that	 it	was	placing	 in	
the	path	of	capital	formation.40	The	SEC	responded	in	time‐worn	fashion,	promising	
a	 review	of	 its	 regulations	 to	 assess	 their	 effect	 on	 the	U.S.	 capital	markets.41	The	
SEC’s	 delaying	 tactic	 did	 not	 work,	 however,	 as	 a	 Republican	 House	 of	
																																																																		
38	Evelyn	 M.	 Rusli,	 Charges	Filed	Against	Brokerage	Firms	That	Trade	Private	 Shares¸	 N.Y.	
TIMES	(March	14,	2012).	
39	Facebook’s	initial	registration	statement	for	its	IPO	disclosed	that	it	had	been	contacted	by	
SEC	staff	 in	 connection	with	 its	 investigation	 into	alternative	 trading	venues.	Alison	Frankel,	What	
everyone	 missed	 in	 Facebook’s	 IPO	 filing,	 ThomsonReuters	 News	 &	 Insight	 Feb.	 2,	 2012).	 No	
enforcement	action,	however,	was	filed	against	Facebook.	
40	Letter from	U.S.	Representative	Darrell	 Issa	 to	Mary	 Schapiro,	 Chairman,	 SEC	 (March	22,	
2011),	available	at	http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/resourcecenter/Issa.041211.pdf.	
41	Letter	from	S.E.C.	Chairman	Mary	Schapiro	to	U.S.	Representative	Darrell	 Issa,	Chairman,	
U.S.	House	Oversight	Committee,	available	at	http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro‐issa‐letter‐
040611.pdf	(April	6,	2011).	
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Representatives,	anxious	to	 latch	on	to	a	wedge	issue	to	make	the	Democrats	 look	
bad	in	an	election	year,	pushed	forward	with	legislation.	That	bill	would	ultimately	
become	the	JOBS	Act.	President	Barack	Obama,	anxious	to	be	seen	as	“pro‐growth”	
while	 facing	an	economy	still	plagued	by	high	 levels	of	unemployment,	 signed	 the	
JOBS	Act	into	law.42	The	SEC’s	opposition	to	the	bill43	carried	little	weight	in	the	face	
of	those	electoral	imperatives.	
A	key	goal	of	the	JOBS	Act	was	to	jump	start	the	market	for	IPOs	by	easing	the	
burden	of	public	company	status	on	newly	public	companies.	A	substantial	expense	
was	 eliminated	 for	 post‐IPO	 companies	 by	 exempting	 them	 from	 §	 404	 of	 the	
Sarbanes‐Oxley	 Act,	 which	 requires	 auditor	 assessment	 of	 a	 company’s	 internal	
controls.44	The	 JOBS	Act	also	 reduced	 the	audited	 financial	 statement	 requirement	
for	IPOs	to	only	two	years.45	These	regulatory	relaxations	last	for	five	years	from	a	
company’s	 IPO	 or	 until	 the	 company	 reaches	 $1	 billion	 in	 annual	 revenue,	
whichever	is	sooner.46		
The	 JOBS	 Act	 also	 loosens	 the	 gun	 jumping	 rules.	 The	 JOBS	 Act	 authorizes	
issuers	 to	 “test	 the	 waters”	 with	 qualified	 institutional	 buyers	 and	 accredited	
																																																																		
42	Jonathan	Weisman,	Final	Approval	by	House	Sends	Jobs	Bill	to	President	for	Signature,	N.Y.	
Times	(March	27,	2012).	
43	David	 Hilzenrath,	 Jobs	 Act	 could	 remove	 investor	 protections,	 SEC	 chair	Mary	 Schapiro	
warns,	 WASH.	POST	 (March	 14,	 2012)(“	 “Too	 often,	 investors	 are	 the	 target	 of	 fraudulent	 schemes	
disguised	as	investment	opportunities,”	Schapiro	wrote.	“As	you	know,	if	the	balance	is	tipped	to	the	
point	where	 investors	are	not	 confident	 that	 there	 are	 appropriate	protections,	 investors	will	 lose	
confidence	 in	 our	 markets,	 and	 capital	 formation	 will	 ultimately	 be	 made	 more	 difficult	 and	
expensive.””).	 State	 securities	 regulators	 also	 voiced	 their	 opposition.	 North	 American	 Securities	
Administrators	 Association,	The	JOBS	Act	an	Investor	Protection	Disaster	Waiting	to	Happen	 (March	
22,	2012).	
44	JOBS	Act	§	103.	
45	JOBS	Act	§	104,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	7(a)(2)(A).	
46	JOBS	Act	§	101,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	2(a)(19)	and	Exchange	Act	3(a)(80).	
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investors	 prior	 to	 filing	 a	 registration	 statement.47	The	 goal	 is	 to	 assess	 whether	
there	 is	 demand	 for	 the	 company’s	 shares,	 allowing	 the	 company	 to	 avoid	 the	
expense	of	 the	 registration	process	 if	 interest	 is	 lacking.	 In	addition,	 the	 law	 frees	
analysts	to	issue	research	reports	for	new	issuers	during	the	offering	process.48	The	
goal	of	this	provision	is	to	promote	demand	for	the	company’s	shares.	
The	 JOBS	Act	 targeted	 two	SEC	 regulations	 relevant	 to	 the	Facebook	affair.	
The	first,	pertaining	to	the	Securities	Act,	was	the	SEC’s	ban	on	general	solicitation	
in	 private	 placements;	 the	 JOBS	Act	 repeals	 that	 prohibition	 outright.49	Under	 the	
JOBS	 Act,	 the	 media	 attention	 that	 Goldman’s	 proposed	 offering	 drew	 would	 not	
have	 jeopardized	 the	§	4(2)	exemption,	 as	 long	as	actual	 sales	were	made	only	 to	
accredited	investors.	The	second	was	the	500‐shareholder	limit	for	triggering	public	
company	 status	 under	 the	Exchange	Act.	 The	 JOBS	Act	 raises	 that	 number	 to	 500	
persons	 who	 are	 not	 accredited	 investors,	 or	 the	 more	 critical	 number,	 2,000	
investors	overall.50	Excluded	from	that	number	are	shareholders	who	received	the	
securities	under	an	employee	compensation	plan	exempted	from	registration.51	This	
latter	 provision	 promises	 to	 substantially	 delay	 the	 point	 at	 which	 a	 growing	
company	 would	 be	 forced	 to	 make	 the	 periodic	 disclosures	 required	 of	 public	
companies.	
																																																																		
47	JOBS	Act	§105(c),	codified	at	.		
48	JOBS	Act	§	105,	codified	as	.	
49	JOBS	Act	§	201,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	4(b).	
Congress	also	authorized	an	exemption	for	“crowdfunding.”	JOBS	Act	§§	301‐305,	codified	at	
Securities	Act	§§	4(6),	4A,	&	18(b)(4);	Exchange	Act	§§	3(a)(1)(h)	&	12(g)	
50	JOBS	Act	§	501,	codified	at	Exchange	Act	§	12(g)(1)(A).	
51	JOBS	Act	§	502,	codified	at	Exchange	Act	§	12(g)(5)(A).	
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At	 first	 glance,	 these	 two	provisions	 are	 direct	 shots	 across	 the	 SEC’s	 bow,	
moving	 the	 line	 between	 public	 and	 private	 markets	 to	 afford	 private	 markets	
considerably	more	space.	For	 the	SEC,	preservation	of	public	markets	–	populated	
by	a	 sizable	contingent	of	 retail	 investors	 (i.e.,	 voters)	–	 is	an	existential	 task.	The	
agency,	 after	 all,	 wraps	 itself	 in	 the	 mantle	 of	 “the	 investor’s	 advocate,”	 and	 its	
political	support	is	inextricably	connected	to	its	regulation	of	those	public	markets.	
If	the	public	markets	ceased	to	exist,	Congress	would	have	little	interest	in	funding	
the	agency.	
From	another	perspective,	however,	these	provisions	of	the	JOBS	Act	are	far	
from	revolutionary.	Raising	the	threshold	for	filing	under	the	Exchange	Act	does	not	
challenge	 the	notion	 that	 there	should	be	a	clear	dividing	 line	between	public	and	
private;	it	simply	reflects	a	policy	disagreement	between	the	SEC	and	Congress	over	
where	 that	 line	 should	 be	 drawn.	 Congress	 raised	 the	 number	 of	 investors	 for	
triggering	 public	 company	 status,	 but	 left	 intact	 the	 basic	 architecture	 of	 the	
securities	markets	–	both	primary	and	secondary	–	as	reflected	in	the	Securities	Act	
of	1933	and	the	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934.		
Another	 provision	 of	 the	 JOBS	 Act,	 however,	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 blur	 the	
distinction	 between	 private	 and	 public	 in	 a	 much	 more	 profound	 way.	 Congress	
opened	the	door	for	public	offerings	by	smaller	companies	with	substantially	fewer	
restrictions.	 It	 did	 so	 by	 increasing	 the	 SEC’s	 authority	 to	 exempt	 offerings	 from	
registration	under	§	5,	raising	the	offering	limit	under	§	3(b)	tenfold	from	$5	million	
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to	$50	million.52	The	gun	jumping	rules	are	put	aside,	as	companies	are	allowed	to	
“test	the	waters”	prior	to	filing	a	registration	statement.	53	Moreover,	Congress	also	
stipulated	that	the	securities	sold	be	unrestricted,	i.e.,	they	could	be	freely	resold	to	
retail	investors.54	In	a	somewhat	unusual	move,	Congress	mandated	the	adoption	of	
a	new	exemption	by	 the	SEC	pursuant	 to	 this	 authority	 (perhaps	 recognizing	 that	
the	SEC	would	simply	 ignore	 it	otherwise).	 In	a	 concession	 to	 investor	protection,	
however,	 Congress	 did	 allow	 the	 agency	 to	 require	 periodic	 disclosures	 by	
companies	 that	 avail	 themselves	 of	 this	 new	 exemption.55	It	 also	 made	 offering	
disclosures	 subject	 to	 §	 12(a)(2)	 liability	 under	 the	 Securities	 Act,	 but	 not,	
conspicuously,	§	11’s	strict	liability	regime.56	
Where	does	the	private/public	dividing	line	stand	after	the	enactment	of	the	
JOBS	 Act?	 Overall,	 the	 JOBS	 Act	 gives	 private	 companies	 more	 room	 to	 remain	
private	and	eases	the	initial	cost	of	transitioning	to	public	status.	For	the	Securities	
Act,	the	JOBS	Act	makes	it	easier	to	raise	capital	while	staying	private	by	opening	the	
private	placement	process	by	permitting	general	solicitations.	Under	the	Exchange	
Act,	 the	 JOBS	 Act	 raises	 the	 threshold	 for	 triggering	 public	 company	 status.	 For	
companies	 that	 choose	 to	 seek	public	 status,	 the	periodic	disclosures	 required	 for	
the	 first	 five	 years	 should	 be	 less	 expensive	 without	 the	 requirement	 of	 auditor	
certification	of	internal	controls.	Finally,	and	potentially	the	most	radical	change,	the	
new	authority	conferred	upon	the	SEC	to	exempt	offerings	up	to	$50	million	carries	
																																																																		
52	JOBS	Act	§	401,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	3(b)(2)(A).	
53	JOBS	Act	§	401,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	3(b)(2)(E).	
54	JOBS	Act	§	401,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	3(b)(2)(B).	
55	JOBS	Act	§	401,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	3(b)(4).	
56	JOBS	Act	§	401,	codified	at	Securities	Act	§	3(b)(2)(D).	
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with	 it	 the	 intriguing	 possibility	 that	 the	 SEC	 will	 create	 a	 junior	 varsity	 level	 of	
public	companies.	At	this	point,	the	creation	of	a	public	company	incubation	pool	is	
only	a	possibility,	as	it	is	easy	to	see	the	SEC	dragging	its	heels	in	implementing	this	
exemption,	 and	 Congress	 has	 not	 mandated	 a	 date	 for	 its	 adoption.	 Certainly	
nothing	will	happen	at	the	SEC	anytime	soon.	The	agency	is	still	struggling	to	get	out	
from	 under	 a	 rulemaking	 backlog	 created	 by	 the	 Dodd‐Frank	 Act.	 After	 the	 2012	
election,	with	the	spotlight	from	Capitol	Hill	perhaps	less	glaring,57	the	SEC	may	feel	
that	it	has	a	freer	hand	in	imposing	substantial	requirements	on	the	exemption	that	
it	eventually	promulgates.	 If	 it	does	so,	the	SEC	may	strangle	the	JOBS	Act	offering	
exemption	in	its	crib.	
	
III. Mediating the transition from private to public 
	
Milton	 Cohen’s	 central	 insight	 was	 that	 the	 disclosure	 needs	 of	 investors	
were	 the	 same	 in	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	markets	 for	 securities.	 Since	 Cohen	
wrote	his	article	in	the	mid‐1960s,	the	force	of	his	insight	has	been	reinforced	by	the	
widespread	acceptance	of	the	efficient	capital	market	hypothesis	by	both	regulators	
and	 courts.	 Cohen’s	 argument	 was	 that	 disclosure	 obligations	 should	 be	 made	
consistent	 for	 the	 two	 markets.	 The	 implication	 of	 the	 efficient	 capital	 market	
hypothesis,	 however,	 is	 that	 disclosure	 particular	 to	 securities	 offerings	might	 be	
largely	 redundant.	 If	 the	 market	 has	 the	 information	 prior	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
securities,	investors	already	have	the	tools	that	they	need	to	assess	the	value	of	that	
																																																																		
57	See	Mary	 L.	 Shapiro,	 Chair,	 SEC,	 Testimony	 Concerning	 the	 "JOBS	 Act	 in	 Action	 Part	 II:	
Overseeing	Effective	 Implementation	of	 the	 JOBS	Act	at	 the	SEC"	 (June	28,	2012)	 (announcing	 that	
SEC	would	not	meet	deadlines	imposed	in	JOBS	Act).	
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new	 issue.	 Moreover,	 retail	 investors	 can	 free	 ride	 on	 the	 efforts	 of	 institutional	
investors	 when	 purchasing	 if	 they	 are	 all	 participating	 in	 the	 same	 market,	
purchasing	 from	 the	 same	 fungible	pool	of	 securities.	The	pricing	decisions	of	 the	
institutional	 investors	 will	 determine	 the	 market	 price,	 thereby	 providing	 some	
assurance	that	retail	investors	are	getting	a	fair	deal.	
More	 fundamentally,	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 efficient	 capital	 market	
hypothesis	and	its	acceptance	by	the	SEC,	the	regulatory	focus	of	the	Exchange	Act	
has	 shifted.	 Although	 the	 Exchange	 Act	 may	 have	 been	 originally	 about	 investor	
protection,	 the	development	of	 the	 efficient	 capital	market	hypothesis	has	pushed	
toward	 accurate	 pricing	 as	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 Exchange	 Act.	 Investor	 protection	 is	
simply	 a	 happy	 by‐product	 of	 efficient	 pricing.	 If	 markets	 are	 fully	 informed,	 the	
theory	goes,	risks	will	be	accurately	priced.	
	
A. IPOs:	Bad	Deals	
This	shift	in	the	focus	of	the	Exchange	Act	has	implications	for	the	transition	
from	 private	 to	 public.	 Faith	 in	 the	 power	 of	 efficient	 capital	 markets	 to	 protect	
investors	rests,	however,	on	the	efficiency	of	the	underlying	market.	The	comfort	to	
both	 accurate	 pricing	 and	 investor	 protection	 provided	 by	 the	 efficient	 capital	
markets	 hypothesis	 falls	 apart	with	 the	 IPO.	 No	 one	 believes	 that	 IPOs	 reflect	 an	
efficient	capital	market.	In	fact	the	evidence	is	fairly	strong	that	IPOs	are	inefficient.	
IPOs	are	bad	deals.		
IPOs	are	bad	for	companies,	bad	for	insiders,	and	bad	for	investors.	The	only	
parties	 that	clearly	benefit	 from	these	deals	are	 the	 individuals	who	service	 them:	
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accountants,	 lawyers,	 and	 underwriters.	 Especially	 underwriters,	 who	 take	 a	
standard	 commission	 of	 7%	 in	 the	 overwhelming	majority	 of	 IPOs.58	In	 economic	
jargon,	these	professionals	are	termed	“transactions	costs;”	the	term	is	not	intended	
as	 a	 compliment.	 It	 is,	 however,	 less	 tendentious	 than	 “blood‐sucking	 parasite,”	
which	 is	 the	 term	 that	 more	 than	 one	 entrepreneur	 might	 use,	 pained	 by	 giving	
away	such	a	substantial	slice	of	their	growing	business	to	a	mere	salesman.	
Why	are	 IPOs	bad	 for	 companies?	Apart	 from	 the	 substantial	 sums	paid	 to	
the	 blood‐sucking	 parasites,	 IPOs	 suffer	 from	 the	 well‐known	 phenomenon	 of	
underpricing.	 Underpricing	 is	 the	 tendency	 for	 the	 price	 of	 stocks	 to	 rise	
significantly	above	the	offering	price	on	the	first	day	of	secondary	market	trading.59	
From	the	perspective	of	the	issuer,	the	gap	between	the	secondary	market	price	and	
the	offering	price	reflects	unexploited	market	demand	for	the	company’s	shares.	The	
explanations	 offered	 for	 underpricing	 are	 varied,	 including	 insurance	 against	 the	
risk	 of	 liability,60	and	 compensation	 to	 institutional	 investors	 for	 the	 cost	 of	
collecting	 information	 about	 the	 issuer.61	Another	 theory	 is	 that	 underpricing	
encourages	institutional	owners	to	retain	the	shares	at	least	until	the	lock‐up	period	
																																																																		
58Hsuan‐Chi	Chen	&	 Jay	R.	Ritter,	The	Seven‐Percent	Solution,	 55	 J.	 FIN.	 1105,	1105	 (2000)	
(finding	underwriters	invariably	charge	a	seven	percent	commission	for	IPOs	between	$20	and	$80	
million).	
59	Jay	R.	Ritter	&	Ivo	Welch,	A	Review	of	IPO	Activity,	Pricing,	and	Allocations,	57	J.	Fin.	1795		
Table	1	(2002)	(finding	that	between	1980	and	2001,	IPOs	were	underpriced	by	22%	on	average,).	
See	Roger	G.	Ibbotson	&	Jeffrey	F.	Jaffe,	"Hot	Issue"	Markets,	30	J.	Fin.	1027	(1975);	Jay	R.	Ritter,	The	
"Hot	Issue"	Market	of	1980,	57	J.	Bus.	215	(1984).	See	also	Judith	S.	Ruud,	Underwriter	Price	Support	
and	the	IPO	Underpricing	Puzzle,	34	J.	Fin.	Econ.	135	(1993).	
60	See,	e.g.,	Philip	D.	Drake	&	Michael	R.	Vetsuypens,	IPO	Underpricing	and	Insurance	Against	
Legal	Liability,	 22	Fin.	Mgmt.	1	 (1993);	Seha	M.	Tinic,	Anatomy	of	Initial	Public	offerings	of	Common	
Stock,	 43	 J.	 Fin.	 789	 (1988).	But	 see	 Janet	Cooper	Alexander,	The	Lawsuit	Avoidance	Theory	of	Why	
Initial	Public	Offerings	Are	Underpriced,	41	UCLA	L.	Rev.	17	(1993).	
61	Ravi	 Jagannathan	 &	 Ann	 E.	 Sherman,	 Reforming	 the	Bookbuilding	Process	 for	 IPOs,	 17	 J.	
Applied	Corp.	Fin.	2,	6	(2005).	
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expires,	typically	six‐months	after	the	offering,	when	the	insiders	will	be	free	to	sell	
their	shares.		
These	factors	may	play	a	role,	but	there	is	also	the	intriguing	possibility	that	
the	 run‐up	 in	 the	 secondary	 market	 reflects	 speculative	 frenzy	 among	 retail	
investors.	This	speculative	 frenzy	could	not	be	captured	by	 the	 issuer	because	 the	
run‐up	is	driven,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	run‐up	itself,	momentum	trading	on	steroids	
if	you	will.	The	role	of	speculation	would	appear	to	be	part	of	the	story	of	why	book‐
built	 offerings	 continue	 to	 dominate	 auctions	 as	 a	 means	 of	 selling	 securities.	
According	to	this	account,	auctions	have	failed	to	attract	a	market	following	because	
they	offer	no	way	of	restricting	the	“dumb	money.”62	If	retail	investors	are	allowed	
to	 dominate	 the	 pricing	 of	 shares,	 institutional	 investors,	 wary	 of	 the	 “winner’s	
curse,”	 will	 avoid	 the	 offering.	 If	 institutional	 investors	 refuse	 to	 participate,	 the	
prospects	for	a	complete	unraveling	become	all	too	real.		Underpricing	is	simply	the	
by‐product	of	the	need	to	exclude	the	undesirables	from	the	initial	pricing	process.	
Whatever	 the	 cause	 of	 underpricing,	 companies	 pay	 it	 as	 the	 cost	 of	 entry	
into	 the	public	markets.	 IPOs	are	 less	 capital	 raises	 than	 they	are	debutante	balls.	
Newly	public	companies	are	jostling	for	the	attention	of	investors,	and	a	big	bump	in	
price	 on	 the	 first	 day	 of	 trading,	 like	 a	 fabulous	 gown,	 is	 sure	 to	 be	 noticed	 and	
attract	 trading	volume.	The	media	 treat	a	sharp	rise	 in	 the	after‐market	price	as	a	
																																																																		
62	William	Vickrey,	Counterspeculation,	Auctions,	and	Competitive	Sealed	Tenders,	16	J.	FIN.	8,	
20	 (1961)	 ("[Wlhere	 there	 is	much	variation	 in	 the	 state	 of	 information	or	 the	 generally	 expected	
intensity	 of	 desire	 of	 the	 various	 players	 for	 the	 object,	 or	 where	 the	 bidders	 are	 insufficiently	
sophisticated	 to	 discern	 the	 equilibrium‐point	 strategy	 ...	 the	 Dutch	 auction	 is	 likely	 to	 prove	
relatively	inefficient	..	.	.").	
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reflection	of	the	offer’s	“success,”	ignoring	the	money	the	issuer	has	left	on	the	table	
during	the	bookbuilding	process.	
Why	are	IPOs	bad	for	insiders?	Primarily	because	insiders	suffer	substantial	
dilution	of	their	interests	in	the	company	as	a	result	of	the	IPO.	For	companies	with	
the	 best	 prospects,	 the	 information	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 insiders	 and	 outside	
investors	(along	with	the	potential	 for	 fraud	by	 insiders)	means	that	 investors	are	
likely	to	substantially	discount	the	amount	they	are	willing	to	pay	for	the	company’s	
shares.	 That	 discounting	will	 be	mitigated,	 but	 not	 eliminated,	 by	mandatory	 and	
voluntary	 disclosures.	 Anti‐fraud	 enforcement	 operates	 substantially	 below	100%	
accuracy,	so	some	stretching	of	the	truth	will	slip	through	unsanctioned.	Moreover,	
complete	 disclosure	 is	 a	 practical	 impossibility	 even	 for	 companies	 anxious	 to	 be	
forthcoming.	Worse	yet,	disclosure	will	sometimes	be	bad	for	business,	as	it	conveys	
useful	 information	 to	a	 firm’s	 competitors.63	Given	 these	 limitations	on	disclosure,	
companies	with	below	average	prospects	will	be	able	to	hide	themselves	in	the	pool	
of	all	IPO	firms.	The	inclusion	of	“bad”	firms	in	the	IPO	pool	means	that	better	than	
average	 firms	 will	 suffer	 from	 discounting,	 a	 partial	 lemons	 effect. 64	
Notwithstanding	 these	 dilution	 costs,	 the	 benefit	 to	 insiders	 is	 that	 they	 will	
eventually	enjoy	a	liquid	market	for	their	shares	after	the	lock‐up	expires.	The	costs	
are	worth	it	–	for	some.	Others	stay	private.	
																																																																		
63	See	 Michael	 D.	 Guttentag,	 An	Argument	 for	 Imposing	Disclosure	Requirements	 on	Public	
Companies,	32	FLA.	ST.	L.	REV.	132,	151	(2004)	(noting	greater	disclosure	in	private	deals	relative	to	
disclosures	made	by	public	companies).	
64 	George	 A.	 Akerlof,	 The	 Market	 for	 "Lemons":	 Quality	 Uncertainty	 and	 the	 Market	
Mechanism,	84	Q.J.	ECON.	488	(1970).	
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Why	 are	 IPOs	 bad	 for	 investors?	 Despite	 the	 underpricing	 that	 manifests	
itself	 in	 the	 secondary	market	on	 the	day	 that	 the	 company	goes	public,	 the	 long‐
term	 performance	 of	 IPO	 stocks	 trails	 the	 risk‐adjusted	 returns	 available	 from	
holding	 the	 market	 portfolio.65	Given	 that	 this	 underperformance	 is	 both	 long‐
standing	 and	well‐documented,	why	 do	 investors	 continue	 to	 invest	 in	 IPOs?	One	
answer	 is	 that	 they	 are	 lured	 into	 foolish	 purchases	 by	 crafty	 Wall	 Street	
salespeople.	It	is	a	Wall	Street	truism	that	“new	issues	are	sold,	not	bought.”66	This	
proposition	 is	 somewhat	 difficult	 to	 square	 with	 the	 prevalence	 of	 institutional	
investors	 among	 the	 lucky	 recipients	 in	 IPO	 allocations.67	Those	 institutional	
investors,	 however,	 may	 be	 counting	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 flip	 the	 shares	 to	 retail	
investors	 in	 the	 secondary	 market.68	Lurking	 in	 the	 background	 here,	 especially	
when	 combined	with	 the	 underpricing	 phenomenon,	 is	 the	worry	 that	 secondary	
market	 prices	 may	 be	 driven	 by	 a	 lottery	 mentality,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 near	 term.	
Investors	may	be	willing	to	tolerate	market‐lagging	returns	overall	in	exchange	for	
the	 possibility	 that	 one	 of	 their	 purchases	may	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 the	 next	 Apple	 or	
Microsoft.	
	
B.	 Facebook	Again	
																																																																		
65	Jonathan	 A.	 Shayne	 &	 Larry	 D.	 Soderquist,	 Inefficiency	 in	 the	Market	 for	 Initial	 Public	
Qfferings,	 448	 VAND.	 L.	 REV.	 965,	 970	 (1995);	 Terzah	 Ewing,	 Burnt	Offerings?	 Street	Debuts	Are	
Fizzling	After	Pop,	WALL	ST.	J.,	Apr.	26,	2000,	at	C1.	
66	Louis	Lowenstein,	Shareholder	Voting	Rights:	A	Response	to	SEC	Rule	19c‐4	and	to	Professor	
Gilson,	89	Colum.	L.	Rev.	979,	998	(1989).	
67	See	 Reena	 Aggarwal	 et	 al.,	 Institutional	 Allocation	 in	 Initial	 Public	 Qfferings:	 Empirical	
Evidence,	57	J.	FIN.	&	QUANTITATIVE	ANAL.	1421,	1422	(2002)	(finding	that	institutional	investors	
receive	approximately	75%	of	original	IPO	shares	in	an	average	offering).	
68	D.	Cook	et	al.,	On	the	marketing	of	IPOs,	82	J.	Fin.	Econ.	35.	
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Facebook’s	eventual	IPO	provided	a	high	profile	example	of	how	IPOs	can	go	
badly	 wrong.	 Running	 contrary	 to	 the	 typical	 pattern	 of	 underpricing	 in	 IPOs,	
Facebook’s	secondary	market	price	took	a	steep	plunge,	dropping	in	its	first	week	of	
trading	 from	 the	 $38	 offer	 price	 to	 less	 than	 $32.	 A	 good	 deal	 of	 finger	 pointing	
followed.	 A	 variety	 of	 factors	 were	 identified	 as	 the	 culprit,	 with	 the	 most	
straightforward	 being	 the	 company’s	 decision	 to	 issue	 25%	 more	 shares	 than	
originally	 contemplated.69	That	 decision	 no	 doubt	 played	 a	 part	 in	 the	 unusually	
large	allocation	of	 shares	 to	 retail	 investors	 in	 the	offering.70	That	 influx	of	 “dumb	
money”	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 spectre	 of	 the	 “winner’s	 curse.”	71	Morgan	 Stanley,	
Facebook’s	underwriter,	was	faulted	for	its	aggressive	pricing	of	the	stock.72	Nasdaq,	
the	 exchange	 where	 Facebook	 listed	 its	 shares,	 had	 a	 technological	 meltdown,	
causing	a	substantial	number	of	orders	to	apparently	disappear	into	the	ether	on	the	
first	day	of	trading.73	Most	damning,	however,	was	the	revelation	that	analysts	at	a	
number	of	banks,	 including	Morgan	Stanley,	had	revised	downward	their	earnings	
projections	 for	 Facebook,	 based	 on	 difficulties	 the	 company	 had	 disclosed	 with	
making	money	off	of	users	who	accessed	Facebook	through	mobile	devices.	Analysts	
revised	 estimates	 were	 shared	 with	 the	 banks’	 institutional	 clients,	 but	 not	 with	
																																																																		
69	Joe	Nocera,	Facebook’s	Brilliant	Disaster,	NY	Times	(May	25,	2012).	
70	See	Jacob	Bunge,	Aaron	Lucchetti	&	Gina	Chon,	Investors	Pummel	Facebook,	WALL	ST.	J.		A1	
(May	 22,	 2012)	 (“Retail,	 or	 individual	 investors	 usually	 allocated	 up	 to	 20%	 of	 the	 total	 shares	
allotted	in	an	IPO,	but	in	Facebook’s	case,	retail	allocation	was	around	25%”).	
71	See	Lynn	Cowan,	 ‘Oversubscribed’	Is	a	Weak	IPO	Signal,	WALL	ST.	J.	(June	18,	2012)	(“At	the	
heart	of	the	[Facebook	offering]’s	flop	was	a	very	basic	problem:	Too	many	shares	were	sold	at	too	
high	a	price	to	too	many	investors	who	weren’t	committed	to	holding	it	for	very	long.”)	
72	Michael	J.	De		La	Merced,	Evelyn	M.	Rusli,	and	Susane	Craig,	As	Facebook’s	Stock	Struggles,	
Fingers	Start	Pointing,	NY	Times	(May	2,	2012).1	
73	Chuck	Mikolajczak	and	John	McCrank,	Facebook	shares	sink	11	percent	as	reality	overtakes	
hype,	Reuters	(May	22,	2012).	
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retail	 investors.74	Those	 lowered	projections	no	doubt	 fueled	 the	 interest	 of	 those	
institutional	 investors	 in	 flipping	 their	 shares	 to	 retail	 investors	 as	 quickly	 as	
possible	after	the	IPO.	Lawsuits	quickly	followed,75	and	Congress	called	hearings	to	
examine	the	IPO	process	generally.76	
	
C.	 Why	Do	IPOs	Persist?	
If	 IPOs	are	such	bad	deals,	why	do	 they	persist?	Under	 the	 current	 regime,	
IPOs	are	a	practical	necessity,	but	from	the	perspective	of	efficient	capital	allocation	
they	 have	 little	 to	 commend	 them.	 The	 common	 theme	 running	 through	 the	
problems	 with	 IPOs	 for	 companies,	 insiders,	 and	 investors	 is	 information	
asymmetry.	 Investors	 are	not	 fully	 informed	and	 it	 is	 costly	 to	provide	 them	with	
credible	 information.	 Speculation	 and	 irrational	 exuberance,	 fueled	by	Wall	 Street	
marketing	and	media	attention,	grease	the	wheels	for	deals	that	do	not	have	a	lot	to	
recommend	them	other	than	the	fact	that	they	are	the	entrée	to	the	big	 leagues	of	
public	company	status.	From	the	perspective	of	both	capital	formation	and	investor	
protection,	IPOs	are	a	failure.	We	see	similarly	poor	results	for	reverse	mergers	and	
PIPEs,	alternative	(and	somewhat	dimly	lit)	avenues	for	reaching	the	ultimate	goal	
of	public	company	status.77	These	transactions	share	with	the	IPOs	the	expectation	
																																																																		
74	Evelyn	M.	Rusli,	Ben	Protess,	and	Michael	 J.	De	 	La	Merced,	Questions	of	Fair	Play	Arise	in	
Facebook	I.P.O.	Process,	NY	Times	(May	23,	2012).	
75	Peter	J.	Henning	and	Steven	M.	Davidoff,	The	Facebook	I.P.O.’s	Potential	Legal	Exposure,	NY	
Times	(May	23,	2012).	
76	Jean	Eaglesham	and	Telis	Demos,	Lawmakers	Push	for	Overhaul	of	IPO	Process,	Wall	 St.	 J.	
(June	21,	2012).	
77	See	Langevoort	and	Thompson,	Cornell	L.	Rev.	
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that	 the	 issued	 shares	will	 be	 dumped	 on	 public	 investors	 after	 a	 holding	 period,	
perhaps	accompanied	by	aggressive	selling	efforts.		
In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 sketch	 out	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 IPO	designed	 to	 deal	
with	the	problem	of	information	asymmetry.	I	argue	that	my	alternative	is	superior	
to	 the	existing	regime,	both	 from	the	perspective	of	efficient	capital	allocation	and	
the	protection	of	retail	investors.	
	
IV. A Two‐Tier Alternative 
	
The	 public‐private	 dividing	 line	 is	 on	 shaky	 ground.	 Congress	 has	 pushed	
back	the	public	line	for	the	Exchange	Act	with	the	JOBS	Act.	For	the	Securities	Act,	
the	 SEC’s	 adoption	 of	 the	 effective	 equivalent	 of	 company	 registration	 suggests	 a	
loss	of	faith	in	the	gun‐jumping	rules;	Congress	is	unlikely	to	lead	a	revival.	At	least	
for	seasoned	offerings	by	the	largest	public	issuers,	the	SEC	no	longer	believes	that	
the	gun	jumping	rules	are	needed	to	quell	speculation.	If	we	have	full	disclosure,	the	
technology	 to	distribute	 that	 information,	 and	an	 informationally	efficient	market,	
do	we	need	the	gun‐jumping	rules	of	§	5?	The	gun	jumping	rules	linger	on,	in	rather	
diluted	form	after	the	JOBS	Act,	only	for	IPOs.	And	yet	we	saw	in	the	last	section	that	
the	 gun‐jumping	 rules	 leave	 much	 to	 be	 desired	 if	 the	 goal	 is	 efficient	 capital	
formation;	the	rules	fall	far	short	of	achieving	that	goal	in	IPOs.	The	only	remaining	
justification	 for	 the	gun‐jumping,	 if	 any,	 is	 investor	protection	and	even	 there,	 the	
rules	are	of	dubious	utility.		The	inefficiency	of	the	IPO	market	persists.	
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This	 shift	 by	 Congress	 and	 the	 SEC	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 for	 the	
dividing	line	between	private	and	public.	What	if	all	public	offerings	were	seasoned	
offerings	with	 a	 price	 informed	 both	 by	 full	 disclosure	 and	 a	 pre‐existing	 trading	
market?	Would	investors	be	harmed	if	we	eliminated	IPOs?	Could	we	achieve	more	
efficient	capital	formation	and	better	investor	protection	simultaneously?		
My	 proposal	 is	 inspired	 by	 a	 simple	 sporting	 analogy:	 the	 English	 Premier	
League.	The	league	has	twenty	teams,	and	the	three	worst	teams	at	the	end	of	each	
season	 are	 relegated	 to	 the	 Football	 League	 Championship,	 while	 the	 top	 three	
teams	 from	that	division	are	promoted.	My	proposal	 is	 for	a	 “Premier	League”	 for	
public	companies	and	a	lower	tier	for	private	companies,	with	distinct	primary	and	
secondary	markets	for	each.		
Under	 my	 proposal,	 companies	 would	 go	 up	 –	 and	 down	 –	 between	 the	
markets	as	warranted.	The	number	of	companies	in	the	public	market	would	not	be	
limited,	 however,	 as	 teams	 are	 in	 the	 Premier	 League.	 Any	 company	 reaching	 a	
certain	 quantitative	 bench	 mark	 –	 say	 $75	 million	 in	 market	 capitalization,	 a	
threshold	currently	used	by	 the	SEC	 for	shelf	 registration78	–	would	be	eligible	 for	
elevation	 to	 the	 public	 market.79	Issuers	 would	 be	 able	 to	 choose	 their	 status;	
companies	would	not	be	dragged	into	the	top	tier	against	their	will.	Once	they	opted	
for	 public	 status,	 however,	 companies	 would	 be	 obliged	 to	 satisfy	 the	 periodic	
reporting	 obligations	 of	 the	 Exchange	 Act	 for	 as	 long	 as	 they	 remained	 public.	 I	
develop	below	how	I	anticipate	the	process	might	work.	
																																																																		
78	Securities	Act,	Rule	415.	
79	I	use	market	capitalization	here	simply	for	ease	of	exposition.	The	quantitative	benchmark	
might	alternatively	be	based	on	trading	volume.	See	Langevoort	&	Thompson,	supra	note.	
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A. The	private	market	
Issuers	below	the	quantitative	benchmark	would	be	limited	in	their	access	to	
both	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	 markets.	 Their	 securities	 could	 be	 sold	 only	 to	
accredited	 investors,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 standards	 under	 Regulation	 D	 or	 §	 4(2).	 In	
contrast	 to	 current	 practice,	 however,	 those	 securities	 could	 not	 be	 freely	 resold	
after	 a	 minimum	 holding	 period.80	Instead,	 the	 issuer	 would	 be	 required	 to	 limit	
transfer	 of	 those	 shares	 to	 accredited	 investors.81	Among	 accredited	 investors,	
however,	the	securities	could	be	resold	without	jeopardizing	the	issuer’s	exemption.		
I	 anticipate	 organized	 markets	 for	 private	 trading	 along	 the	 lines	 of	
SecondMarket	 and	 SharesPost;	 the	 advent	 of	 these	 markets	 makes	 my	 proposal	
feasible.	 The	 proposal	 here	 takes	 advantage	 of	 those	 developments,	 but	 it	 also	
works	 off	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Rule	 144A	 market,	 which	 is	 currently	 limited	 to	
Qualified	 Institutional	 Buyers	 (QIBs).	 The	 proposal	 here	 would	 be	 largely	 an	
extension	 of	 that	 existing	market	 for	 QIBs,	 by	 including	 accredited	 investors.	 The	
QIB	market	 is	estimated	by	 industry	sources	to	have	over	14,000	participants;	 the	
number	of	accredited	investors	surely	dwarfs	that.	The	success	of	that	QIB	market	
suggests	 that	 the	 private	 market	 proposed	 here	 would	 have	 enough	 liquidity	 to	
function	effectively.		
																																																																		
80	That	period	is	currently	one	year	for	non‐public	companies.	Securities	Act,	Rule	144.	
81	See	 Choi,	 supra	 note	 7,	 at	 608	 (“a	 true	 company	 registration	 system	 would	 similarly	
restrict	 the	 trading	 of	 securities	 of	 lightly	 followed	 companies	 with	 little	 public	 information	
regardless	of	the	path	the	securities	to	took	to	market.”).	
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These	 private	 markets	 would	 need	 the	 issuer’s	 consent	 for	 the	 trading	 of	
their	 shares,	 a	 form	 of	 quasi‐listing.	 The	 private	 trading	 market	 would	 be	
responsible	 for	 screening	prospective	 investors	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	met	 the	 SEC’s	
criteria	 for	 accredited	 investors.	 Only	 certified	 accredited	 investors	 would	 be	
allowed	to	participate.	This	category	includes	mutual	funds,	so	retail	investors	could	
access	exposure	to	this	private	market.	They	could	do	so,	however,	only	through	a	
diversified	vehicle	administered	by	an	 investment	manager,	who	would	be	subject	
to	the	usual	array	of	regulations.	
The	question	of	disclosure	in	this	market	poses	a	challenging	issue.	It	would	
defeat	the	market’s	purpose	to	require	the	disclosure	expected	of	a	public	company.	
On	the	other	hand,	some	standardization	of	disclosure	practices	would	likely	benefit	
both	 investors	 and	 issuers.	 There	 are	 some	 fundamentals	 hard	 to	 imagine	 doing	
without,	such	as	audited	financial	statements.	Beyond	that	baseline,	however,	are	a	
range	of	difficult	questions	regarding	materiality.		
One	 possibility	 would	 be	 to	 allow	 private	 markets	 to	 establish	 disclosure	
requirements	 pursuant	 to	 their	 listing	 agreements,	 with	 those	 listing	 agreements	
subject	to	SEC	approval.82	Such	an	arrangement	would	allow	for	some	flexibility	and	
responsiveness	 to	 market	 forces,	 while	 still	 ensuring	 that	 disclosure	 did	 not	 fall	
below	 some	 desired	 minimum.	 The	 SEC	 could	 perhaps	 implement	 regulatory	
oversight	 through	 an	 exemption	 for	 the	 trading	 venues	 from	 exchange	 status	 by	
																																																																		
82	Mary	Kissel,	So	Who	Needs	Wall	Street,	WALL	ST.	J.	A13	(Oct.	29‐30,	2011)	(“SecondMarket	
requires	companies	to	provide	‘audited	financials	and	risk	factors’	to	potential	investors.		‘That’s	not	
required	 under	 the	 SEC	 rules,’	 [SecondMarket’s	 CEO]	 says.	 ‘We	 don’t	 want	 to	 see	 fraudulent	
companies	on	SecondMarket.	We	don’t	want	to	see	people,	you	know,	making	investment	decisions	
witho8ut	being	swell‐informed.	That’s	bad	for	us	as	a	marketplace.’”).	
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imposing	conditions	on	the	exemption.	Alternatively,	the	SEC	could	rely	on	its	new	§	
3(b)	exemption	authority.	The	SEC	could	 impose	periodic	disclosure	requirements	
on	 companies	 relying	 on	 the	 §	 3(b)	 exemption	 to	 sell	 shares	 to	 retail	 investors.	
Companies	that	limited	their	sales	to	accredited	investors	and	restricted	the	transfer	
of	 those	 shares	 only	 to	 other	 accredited	 investors	 could	 be	 exempted	 from	 those	
disclosure	requirements.	
	
B. The	public	market	
Elevation	to	the	public	market	would	be	voluntary	in	my	scheme.	Issuers	that	
were	not	prepared	to	handle	the	burden	of	public	company	obligations	could	limit	
the	transfer	of	their	shares	to	the	private	market,	which	would	be	accessible	only	by	
accredited	 investors.	 If	 a	 company	 felt	 that	 it	 could	 satisfy	 its	 capital	needs	 in	 the	
private	market	it	would	be	free	to	remain	there.	
Companies	 would	 graduate	 to	 the	 public	 market	 based	 on	 market	
capitalization	or	trading	volume	for	common	equity.	These	criteria	are	similar	to	the	
Exchange	 Act’s	 proxies	 for	 active	 investor	 interest,	 but	 they	 are	 more	 readily	
measured	and	less	vulnerable	to	manipulation.	Once	a	company	elected	to	become	
public,	it	would	first	need	to	file	a	Form	10‐K	before	its	shares	would	be	cleared	for	
trading	 in	 the	 public	 market.	 A	 seasoning	 period	 would	 follow,	 with	 the	 filing	 of	
requisite	10‐Qs	during	which	the	shares	would	continue	to	be	traded	in	the	private	
market.	The	prices	in	the	private	market,	however,	would	now	be	informed	by	full	
disclosure.	 After	 the	 seasoning	 period,	 accredited	 investors	 would	 be	 able	 to	 sell	
their	shares	in	the	public	market.	This	opportunity	would	be	available	whether	the	
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accredited	 investor	 had	 purchased	 their	 shares	 from	 the	 company	 or	 from	 other	
accredited	investors	in	the	private	trading	market.	That	public	market	could	be	an	
exchange,	if	the	company	chose	to	list,	or	the	over‐the‐counter	market.	Either	way,	
the	trading	price	in	the	public	market	would	be	informed	by	the	prior	trading	in	the	
private	market,	as	well	as	the	new	information	released	in	the	company’s	10‐K	and	
10‐Qs.		
The	 private	 market	 seasoning	 period	 before	 public	 trading	 would	 be	
permitted	 raises	 some	 difficult	 questions.	 It	 would	 not	 be	 practicable	 to	 limit	
companies	from	any	sales	during	the	seasoning	period;	capital	needs	do	not	go	away	
simply	because	 the	 company	 is	making	 the	 transition	 to	public	 status.	 Indeed,	 the	
need	for	capital	 is	presumably	pushing	the	company	to	bear	the	burdens	of	public	
status.	 This	 creates	 the	 possibility	 that	 companies	 could	 use	 investment	 banks	 or	
other	intermediaries,	such	as	hedge	funds,	as	conduits	during	the	seasoning	period.	
The	viability	of	this	strategy	is	limited,	however,	by	the	fact	that	the	intermediaries	
could	only	sell	the	shares	to	other	accredited	investors	during	the	seasoning	period.	
Thus,	 the	 risks	 of	 an	 unregistered	 “distribution”	 are	 low.	 Moreover,	 unless	 the	
company	has	very	pressing	capital	needs,	it	is	unlikely	to	tolerate	much	of	a	liquidity	
discount	for	its	shares,	which	it	will	be	able	to	freely	sell	after	the	seasoning	period	
expires.	 It	might,	however,	be	necessary	 to	 impose	volume	 limits	on	sellers	 in	 the	
public	markets	during	a	transition	period	to	allow	the	trading	market	to	develop.	A	
quick	 dump	 of	 shares	 immediately	 after	 the	 seasoning	 period	 expired	 has	 the	
potential	to	reproduce	the	irrational	speculation	that	taints	the	market	for	IPOs.	
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Only	after	 the	company	graduated	 to	having	 its	 shares	 traded	 in	 the	public	
market	 would	 the	 company	 be	 free	 to	 sell	 additional	 equity	 to	 public	 investors.	
What	 form	 should	 sales	 by	 the	 issuer	 take?	 The	 logic	 of	 the	 proposal,	 with	 its	
preference	 for	 the	 superior	 informational	 efficiency	 of	 trading	 markets,	 suggests	
that	 issuers	 selling	 equity	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 at‐the‐market	 (ATM)	 offerings.	
Issuers	would	 sell	directly	 into	 the	public	 trading	market	 instead	of	 relying	on	an	
underwriter	 to	 identify	 (create?)	demand.	This	approach	puts	 its	 faith	 in	markets,	
rather	than	salesmen,	for	efficient	pricing.	Unfortunately,	this	strategy	has	its	limits.	
ATM	offerings	are	a	rapidly	growing	portion	of	seasoned	equity	offerings,83	but	they	
are	still	dwarfed	by	traditional	bookbuilt	offerings.	Particularly	for	larger	offerings,	
the	 liquidity	of	 the	secondary	 trading	market	may	be	 insufficient	 to	absorb	such	a	
large	number	of	 shares	without	 substantially	diluting	existing	 shareholders.	Could	
we	nudge	issuers	toward	ATM	offerings,	without	mandating	them?	
One	possibility	would	be	to	eliminate	§	11	and	§	12(a)(2)	liability	for	at‐the‐
market	 offerings,	 while	 retaining	 it	 for	 underwritten	 offerings.	 At	 a	 minimum,	 it	
makes	 little	 sense	 to	 impose	 underwriter	 liability	 on	 the	 broker‐dealers	 hired	 by	
issuers	to	manage	ATM	offerings.	If	large	volumes	need	to	be	“sold,	not	bought,”	the	
opportunities	 for	 abuse	 come	 in	 the	 selling	 process.	 SEC	 and	 FINRA	 enforcement	
would	be	needed	to	ensure	that	no	there	no	back‐door	selling	efforts	to	prime	the	
market	for	an	ATM	offering.	Even	for	the	issuer,	the	draconian	threat	of	§	11’s	strict	
																																																																		
83	James	D.	Small	III,	W.	Clayton	Johnson,	&	Leslie	Silverman,	The	resurgence	of	Untied	States	
at‐the	market	equity	offerings	to	raise	capital	in	volatile	equity	markets,	4	Capital	Markets	L.	J.	290,	
292	(2009)	(“From	June	2008	through	the	end	of	April	2009,	more	than	25	issuers	registered	with	
the	SEC	almost	$6.9	billion	of	equity	 securities	 for	 sales	under	equity	distribution	programmes	 (of	
which	more	than	$3.2	billion	was	subsequently	sold	to	investors).”)	
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liability	seems	excessive	for	an	ATM	offering.	ATM	offerings	do	not	really	require	a	
registration	 statement	 or	 a	 prospectus;	 at	most	 they	 need	 an	 8‐K	 announcing	 the	
number	 of	 shares	 to	 be	 offered,	 followed	 by	 another	 8‐K	 disclosing	 the	 number	
actually	 sold.	 Anti‐fraud	 concerns	 could	 be	 addressed	 by	 the	 less	 draconian	 Rule	
10b‐5.		
	
C. Relegation	
If	 there	 are	 private	 companies	 wanting	 to	 rise	 to	 the	 public	 level	 in	 my	
scheme,	it	follows	that	there	are	likely	to	be	public	companies	wanting	to	pursue	the	
reduced	burdens	of	private	status.	An	attractive	feature	of	a	two‐tier	market	is	that	
retail	investors	would	not	be	completely	cut	off	from	liquidity	if	a	company	chooses	
to	 relegate	 itself	 to	 the	 private	 market.	 There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 preclude	 retail	
investors	 from	 selling	 their	 shares	 in	 the	 private	 market,	 even	 if	 they	 would	 be	
barred	 from	 purchasing	 shares	 in	 companies	 that	 dropped	 down	 to	 private	
company	 status.	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 little	 to	 be	 gained	 by	 prohibiting	 companies	
from	 exiting	 the	 public	 pool;	 a	 restrictive	 approach	 will	 simply	 discourage	
companies	 from	 pursuing	 public	 company	 status	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 too	 lenient	 an	approach	may	put	 too	much	 stress	on	 the	 fiduciary	duties	of	
directors	under	state	law	to	prevent	abuses.	
I	therefore	suggest	a	shareholder	vote	be	required	before	a	company	would	
be	permitted	to	drop	from	public	to	private	status.	A	vote,	with	the	usual	disclosures	
required	by	the	federal	proxy	rules,	would	be	a	useful	check	on	private	to	public	to	
private	manipulation	 schemes.	 	 It	 would	 not	 trap	 companies,	 however,	 that	 have	
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struggled	 after	 going	 public.	 The	 company	 would	 have	 to	 make	 its	 case	 to	 its	
shareholders	 that	 the	benefits	of	public	company	status	were	no	 longer	worth	 the	
candle.	 Who	 should	 be	 eligible	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 voting?	 It	 seems	 prudent	 to	
exclude	 the	 votes	 of	 insiders	 and	 controlling	 shareholders,	 but	 should	 we	 also	
sterilize	 the	 votes	 of	 institutional	 investors?	 My	 instinct	 is	 that	 this	 additional	
restriction	would	not	be	necessary.	The	 loss	of	 liquidity	attendant	 to	relegation	 to	
the	 private	 market	 affects	 non‐controlling	 institutional	 investors	 and	 retail	
investors	in	the	same	way;	their	interests	are	aligned.	Giving	the	veto	threat	to	too	
narrow	a	group	raises	the	possibility	of	holdup.		
	
D. Objections	
Won’t	an	expanded	private	market	open	the	door	to	fraud	and	manipulation?	
The	short	answer	is	that	as	long	as	people	are	infected	by	the	love	of	money,	fraud	
will	 always	 be	 with	 us.	 Given	 that	 sad	 fact	 of	 human	 nature,	 we	 should	 funnel	
transactions	to	the	venues	that	make	it	most	difficult	to	get	away	with	fraud.	To	be	
sure,	the	private	market	proposed	here	is	likely	to	have	a	higher	incidence	of	fraud	
and	 manipulation	 than	 the	 public	 market.	 But	 the	 scope	 of	 that	 fraud	 will	
necessarily	 be	 limited	 by	 the	 smaller	 size	 of	 the	 private	markets	 relative	 to	 their	
public	 counterparts.	 Moreover,	 the	 entities	 sponsoring	 trading	 in	 those	 private	
markets	 will	 have	 competitive	 incentives	 to	 take	 cost	 effective	 measures	 to	
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discourage	 fraud.84	And	 the	 SEC	 and	 FINRA	 enforcement	 would	 be	 available	 to	
counter	the	most	egregious	abuses.		
The	 potential	 for	 abuse	 in	 the	 private	 market	 has	 to	 be	 weighed	 against	
reductions	 in	 fraud	 elsewhere.	 In	 particular,	 my	 seasoning	 period	 requirement	
substantially	reduces	the	opportunities	for	fraud	by	companies	entering	the	public	
market.	On	balance,	the	overall	 incidence	of	fraud	may	well	be	reduced.	And	retail	
investors,	who	are	least	able	to	bear	it,	will	almost	certainly	be	exposed	to	less	fraud.	
At	 the	same	time,	capital	 formation	–	efficient	allocation	of	capital	 to	cost‐justified	
projects	–	will	be	enhanced.		
Finally,	 objectors	 to	 my	 proposal	 should	 be	 careful	 to	 avoid	 the	 nirvana	
fallacy.	 The	 alternative	 to	 my	 two‐tier	 proposal	 is	 not	 the	 tight	 regulation	 of	
registered	 offerings	 that	we	 saw	 for	much	 of	 the	 Securities	Act’s	 history,	 it	 is	 the	
public	company	“lite”	status	of	offerings	exempted	under	the	new	§	3(b)	of	the	JOBS	
Act.	 Is	 that	public	company	 incubator	pool	 really	superior	 from	the	perspective	of	
investor	protection?	
	
V. Conclusion 
	
What	 if	 we	 just	 focused	 on	 capital	 formation	 in	 drawing	 the	 line	 between	
private	 and	public	markets?	A	 focus	on	 capital	 formation	 suggests	 that	we	 should	
put	an	end	to	IPOs,	if	we	can	establish	a	viable	alternative.	My	proposed	alternative	
would	 require	 private	 companies	 to	 go	 through	 a	 seasoning	 period	 –	 with	
mandatory	disclosure	–	before	selling	securities	to	the	public.	This	seasoning	period	
																																																																		
84	See	 A.C.	 Pritchard,	 Markets	 as	 Monitors:	 	 A	 Proposal	 To	 Replace	 Class	 Actions	 with	
Exchanges	as	Securities	Fraud	Monitors,	85	VA.	L.	REV.	925	(1999)	
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would	mark	the	line	between	private	and	public,	rather	than	the	current	standards	
of	exchange	listing,	number	of	shareholders,	or	the	filing	of	a	registration	statement	
for	an	initial	public	offering.		
The	foundation	of	my	proposal	rests	on	two	central	premises:	(1)	IPOs	are	an	
inefficient	 means	 of	 capital	 formation;	 and	 (2)	 private	 markets,	 with	 pools	 of	
liquidity	that	are	continuing	to	expand,	will	be	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	capital	needs	
of	 growing	 companies	until	 they	are	 ready	 for	 the	burdens	 that	 come	with	public	
company	status.	The	evidence	for	the	first	proposition	is	consistent	and	strong.	The	
second	proposition	blazes	a	path	 into	still	uncharted	territory.	The	Rule	144A	QIB	
market	and	the	rise	of	private	markets	like	SecondMarket	and	SharesPost	show	the	
potential	 of	 private	 trading	markets.	 Until	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 JOBS	 Act,	 however,	
those	markets	have	been	hamstrung	by	the	500‐shareholder	limit	triggering	public	
company	status.	That	limit	has	now	been	raised	to	2000	shareholders	of	record.	On	
its	 face,	 this	 change	 promises	 to	 substantially	 increase	 the	 liquidity	 of	 private	
markets.	 More	 time	 will	 be	 needed,	 however,	 before	 we	 can	 assess	 whether	 this	
expansion	of	the	private	markets	gains	market	acceptance.	
	 The	bottom	line	is	that	with	the	passage	of	the	JOBS	Act,	change	is	coming	to	
the	demarcation	between	private	and	public	 status	under	 the	 securities	 laws.	The	
looming	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 SEC	 will	 attempt	 to	 obstruct	 this	 change,	 or	
embrace	it	in	an	effort	to	promote	greater	capital	formation.	My	proposal	affords	the	
SEC	 an	 opportunity	 to	 promote	 capital	 formation	 while	 also	 enhancing	 investor	
protection.	 The	 two‐tier	 private/public	 market	 scheme	 outlined	 here	 would	
complete	the	company	registration	model	put	forward	by	Milton	Cohen	nearly	a	half	
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century	ago.	We	should	harness	private	markets	to	promote	the	public	good	and	rid	
ourselves	of	the	inefficiencies	of	IPOs	in	the	process.	
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